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SubjectRe: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] security/keys: use constant time memory comparison for macs
On Sat, 10 Jun 2017, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:

> Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
> Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org


Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>


--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

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