| From | Greg Kroah-Hartman <> | Subject | [PATCH 4.10 24/62] ipv6: sr: fix out-of-bounds access in SRH validation | Date | Mon, 1 May 2017 14:34:37 -0700 |
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4.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: David Lebrun <david.lebrun@uclouvain.be>
[ Upstream commit 2f3bb64247b5b083d05ccecad9c2e139bbfdc294 ]
This patch fixes an out-of-bounds access in seg6_validate_srh() when the trailing data is less than sizeof(struct sr6_tlv).
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <david.lebrun@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv6/seg6.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/net/ipv6/seg6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6.c @@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ bool seg6_validate_srh(struct ipv6_sr_hd struct sr6_tlv *tlv; unsigned int tlv_len; + if (trailing < sizeof(*tlv)) + return false; + tlv = (struct sr6_tlv *)((unsigned char *)srh + tlv_offset); tlv_len = sizeof(*tlv) + tlv->len;
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