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Subject[PATCH 3/3] KEYS: Use memzero_explicit() for secret data
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From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

I don't think GCC has figured out how to optimize the memset() away, but
they might eventually so let's future proof this code a bit.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---

security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index d7a4969b2dd3..4fb315cddf5b 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ static void encrypted_destroy(struct key *key)
if (!epayload)
return;

- memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ memzero_explicit(epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
kfree(key->payload.data[0]);
}

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