Messages in this thread | | | From | Stephan Müller <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] random: Don't overwrite CRNG state in crng_initialize() | Date | Thu, 09 Feb 2017 10:26:19 +0100 |
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Am Donnerstag, 9. Februar 2017, 02:04:32 CET schrieb Alden Tondettar:
Hi Alden,
> On Thu, Feb 09, 2017 at 07:47:25AM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 08, 2017 at 08:31:26PM -0700, Alden Tondettar wrote: > > > In short, the situation is: > > > > > > A) No usable hardware RNG or arch_get_random() (or we don't trust it...) > > > > Wait, why would you not trust arch_get_random()? Is it broken somehow > > on some arches? If so, why not fix that as well? > > arch_get_random() makes use of RDRAND and similar CPU features. Some people > do not wish to trust black-box RNG implementations.
Furthermore, this function is only implemented on x86. On other arches, it is a noop.
Ciao Stephan
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