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SubjectRe: BUG: bad usercopy in memdup_user
On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 07:37:46PM +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 09:12:58AM +0100, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 1:57 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > > On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 6:22 AM, Tetsuo Handa
> > >> This BUG is reporting
> > >>
> > >> [ 26.089789] usercopy: kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to 0000000022a5b430 (kmalloc-1024) (1024 bytes)
> > >>
> > >> line. But isn't 0000000022a5b430 strange for kmalloc(1024, GFP_KERNEL)ed kernel address?
> > >
> > > The address is hashed (see the %p threads for 4.15).
> >
> >
> > +Tobin, is there a way to disable hashing entirely? The only
> > designation of syzbot is providing crash reports to kernel developers
> > with as much info as possible. It's fine for it to leak whatever.
>
> We have new specifier %px to print addresses in hex if leaking info is
> not a worry.

Could we have a way to know that the printed address is hashed and not just
a pointer getting completely scrogged? Perhaps prefix it with ... a hash!
So this line would look like:

[ 26.089789] usercopy: kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to #0000000022a5b430 (kmalloc-1024) (1024 bytes)

Or does that miss the point of hashing the address, so the attacker
thinks its a real address?

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