lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2017]   [Dec]   [15]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
Subject[RFC GIT PULL] x86 Page Table Isolation (PTI) syscall entry code preparatory patches
Linus,

Please consider pulling the latest x86-pti-for-linus git tree from:

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-pti-for-linus

# HEAD: eeb17ad55b3f7959805ae995fe955d6d93e67e89 Merge branch 'WIP.x86/pti.entry' into x86/pti

These are the x86-64 low level entry code preparatory patches for the page table
isolation patches - which are required for PTI, which addresses KASLR and similar
information leaks.

The merges and commits have the following structure:

1)

The tree with HEAD 2533a63618fc is the 'v4.14 backporting base tree': it's a
handful of x86 entry code specific merges, combined with a handful of cherry-picks.
The cherry-picks are marked in such a clear fashion:

[ Note, this commit is a cherry-picked version of:

d17a1d97dc20: ("x86/mm/kasan: don't use vmemmap_populate() to initialize shadow")

... for easier x86 entry code testing and back-porting. ]

Otherwise they contain the original changelog. There's also a namespace
preparatory patch:

d78b637b29a2: drivers/misc/intel/pti: Rename the header file to free up the namespace

2)

The cherry-picked tree is merged with a matching v4.14 tree in a conflict-free
fashion, i.e. an upstream tree version is merged where all the cherry-picks match
and there's no content conflict.

3)

The remaining new commits are the PTI entry code changes:

aaa01e2049fb: x86/entry/64: Don't use the entry stack on XENPV and optimize sync_regs()
c5e1a2f04b59: x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky
1f6688f1b26c: x86/paravirt: Provide a way to check for hypervisors
4a24c80e6f8a: x86/paravirt: Dont patch flush_tlb_single
11a1251e3a3c: x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only
dff71e3c0e18: x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code
f3116218fe9e: x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary
9e2dc3874178: x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area
65bbc819a025: x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline
813b4125a835: x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack
4f79eec94c07: x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries
21b90b9dc777: x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack
73761a513764: x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0
566999c89d26: x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area
df55611bc5d0: x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct
97a1894ff954: x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks
5ed1fcd523b9: x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss
60b6c4ac2d51: x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area
5bf215b74703: x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area
f61ef66a7bb4: x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order
3ae6bdda6853: x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for the SYSENTER stack
63372c118470: x86/entry/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack
69282699385f: x86/irq/64: Print the offending IP in the stack overflow warning
1192b8b8232a: x86/irq: Remove an old outdated comment about context tracking races
b8573e790649: x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully
58b6fe6672f8: x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow
3961a7f4adc8: x86/entry/64/paravirt: Use paravirt-safe macro to access eflags

The main changes here are Andy Lutomirski's changes to switch the x86-64 entry code
to use the 'entry trampoline stack', which is in the fixmap area, and as such doesn't
require any %gs relative kernel percpu data to enter/exit the kernel. This, besides
helping fix KASLR leaks, also robustifies the x86 entry code.

Thanks,

Ingo

------------------>

Andi Kleen (1):
perf/x86: Enable free running PEBS for REGS_USER/INTR

Andrey Ryabinin (1):
x86/mm/kasan: Don't use vmemmap_populate() to initialize shadow

Andy Lutomirski (22):
x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow
x86/irq: Remove an old outdated comment about context tracking races
x86/irq/64: Print the offending IP in the stack overflow warning
x86/entry/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack
x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for the SYSENTER stack
x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order
x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area
x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area
x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss
x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks
x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct
x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area
x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0
x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack
x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries
x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack
x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline
x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area
x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary
x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code
x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only
x86/entry/64: Don't use the entry stack on XENPV and optimize sync_regs()

Boris Ostrovsky (1):
x86/entry/64/paravirt: Use paravirt-safe macro to access eflags

Ingo Molnar (3):
x86/cpufeatures: Re-tabulate the X86_FEATURE definitions
x86/cpufeatures: Fix various details in the feature definitions
drivers/misc/intel/pti: Rename the header file to free up the namespace

Josh Poimboeuf (1):
x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully

Kirill A. Shutemov (1):
x86/xen: Provide pre-built page tables only for CONFIG_XEN_PV=y and CONFIG_XEN_PVH=y

Ricardo Neri (1):
x86/cpufeature: Add User-Mode Instruction Prevention definitions

Rudolf Marek (1):
x86: Make X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK detectable in CPUID on AMD

Thomas Gleixner (3):
x86/paravirt: Dont patch flush_tlb_single
x86/paravirt: Provide a way to check for hypervisors
x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky

Will Deacon (1):
locking/barriers: Convert users of lockless_dereference() to READ_ONCE()


arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 6 +-
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 189 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 7 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h | 11 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 68 ++++++++++++-
arch/x86/include/asm/hypervisor.h | 25 +++--
arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h | 3 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kdebug.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h | 9 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 59 +++++++----
arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h | 3 +
arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 8 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 1 -
arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h | 7 ++
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 6 ++
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c | 9 +-
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c | 4 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 170 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------
arch/x86/kernel/doublefault.c | 36 ++++---
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 74 +++++++++++---
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c | 6 ++
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c | 6 ++
arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/irq.c | 12 ---
arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/paravirt_patch_64.c | 2 -
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 19 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 14 +--
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 69 ++++++++-----
arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c | 88 +++++++---------
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 9 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/lib/delay.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 18 +++-
arch/x86/power/cpu.c | 16 +--
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 2 +-
drivers/misc/pti.c | 2 +-
include/linux/{pti.h => intel-pti.h} | 6 +-
42 files changed, 695 insertions(+), 290 deletions(-)

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2017-12-16 02:59    [W:4.898 / U:0.032 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site