Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sat, 16 Dec 2017 02:58:59 +0100 | From | Ingo Molnar <> | Subject | [RFC GIT PULL] x86 Page Table Isolation (PTI) syscall entry code preparatory patches |
| |
Linus,
Please consider pulling the latest x86-pti-for-linus git tree from:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-pti-for-linus
# HEAD: eeb17ad55b3f7959805ae995fe955d6d93e67e89 Merge branch 'WIP.x86/pti.entry' into x86/pti
These are the x86-64 low level entry code preparatory patches for the page table isolation patches - which are required for PTI, which addresses KASLR and similar information leaks.
The merges and commits have the following structure:
1)
The tree with HEAD 2533a63618fc is the 'v4.14 backporting base tree': it's a handful of x86 entry code specific merges, combined with a handful of cherry-picks. The cherry-picks are marked in such a clear fashion:
[ Note, this commit is a cherry-picked version of:
d17a1d97dc20: ("x86/mm/kasan: don't use vmemmap_populate() to initialize shadow")
... for easier x86 entry code testing and back-porting. ]
Otherwise they contain the original changelog. There's also a namespace preparatory patch:
d78b637b29a2: drivers/misc/intel/pti: Rename the header file to free up the namespace
2)
The cherry-picked tree is merged with a matching v4.14 tree in a conflict-free fashion, i.e. an upstream tree version is merged where all the cherry-picks match and there's no content conflict.
3)
The remaining new commits are the PTI entry code changes:
aaa01e2049fb: x86/entry/64: Don't use the entry stack on XENPV and optimize sync_regs() c5e1a2f04b59: x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky 1f6688f1b26c: x86/paravirt: Provide a way to check for hypervisors 4a24c80e6f8a: x86/paravirt: Dont patch flush_tlb_single 11a1251e3a3c: x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only dff71e3c0e18: x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code f3116218fe9e: x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary 9e2dc3874178: x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area 65bbc819a025: x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline 813b4125a835: x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack 4f79eec94c07: x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries 21b90b9dc777: x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack 73761a513764: x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0 566999c89d26: x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area df55611bc5d0: x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct 97a1894ff954: x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks 5ed1fcd523b9: x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss 60b6c4ac2d51: x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area 5bf215b74703: x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area f61ef66a7bb4: x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order 3ae6bdda6853: x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for the SYSENTER stack 63372c118470: x86/entry/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack 69282699385f: x86/irq/64: Print the offending IP in the stack overflow warning 1192b8b8232a: x86/irq: Remove an old outdated comment about context tracking races b8573e790649: x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully 58b6fe6672f8: x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow 3961a7f4adc8: x86/entry/64/paravirt: Use paravirt-safe macro to access eflags
The main changes here are Andy Lutomirski's changes to switch the x86-64 entry code to use the 'entry trampoline stack', which is in the fixmap area, and as such doesn't require any %gs relative kernel percpu data to enter/exit the kernel. This, besides helping fix KASLR leaks, also robustifies the x86 entry code.
Thanks,
Ingo
------------------>
Andi Kleen (1): perf/x86: Enable free running PEBS for REGS_USER/INTR
Andrey Ryabinin (1): x86/mm/kasan: Don't use vmemmap_populate() to initialize shadow
Andy Lutomirski (22): x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow x86/irq: Remove an old outdated comment about context tracking races x86/irq/64: Print the offending IP in the stack overflow warning x86/entry/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for the SYSENTER stack x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0 x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only x86/entry/64: Don't use the entry stack on XENPV and optimize sync_regs()
Boris Ostrovsky (1): x86/entry/64/paravirt: Use paravirt-safe macro to access eflags
Ingo Molnar (3): x86/cpufeatures: Re-tabulate the X86_FEATURE definitions x86/cpufeatures: Fix various details in the feature definitions drivers/misc/intel/pti: Rename the header file to free up the namespace
Josh Poimboeuf (1): x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully
Kirill A. Shutemov (1): x86/xen: Provide pre-built page tables only for CONFIG_XEN_PV=y and CONFIG_XEN_PVH=y
Ricardo Neri (1): x86/cpufeature: Add User-Mode Instruction Prevention definitions
Rudolf Marek (1): x86: Make X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK detectable in CPUID on AMD
Thomas Gleixner (3): x86/paravirt: Dont patch flush_tlb_single x86/paravirt: Provide a way to check for hypervisors x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky
Will Deacon (1): locking/barriers: Convert users of lockless_dereference() to READ_ONCE()
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 6 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 189 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 7 +- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h | 11 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 68 ++++++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/hypervisor.h | 25 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/kdebug.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h | 9 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 59 +++++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 1 - arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h | 7 ++ arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 6 ++ arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c | 9 +- arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 170 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/doublefault.c | 36 ++++--- arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 74 +++++++++++--- arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c | 6 ++ arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c | 6 ++ arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/irq.c | 12 --- arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/paravirt_patch_64.c | 2 - arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 19 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 14 +-- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 69 ++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c | 88 +++++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 9 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 2 +- arch/x86/lib/delay.c | 4 +- arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 18 +++- arch/x86/power/cpu.c | 16 +-- arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +- arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 2 +- drivers/misc/pti.c | 2 +- include/linux/{pti.h => intel-pti.h} | 6 +- 42 files changed, 695 insertions(+), 290 deletions(-)
| |