Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | From | Ingo Molnar <> | Subject | [PATCH 12/43] x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack | Date | Fri, 24 Nov 2017 18:23:40 +0100 |
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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
When we start using an entry trampoline, a #GP from userspace will be delivered on the entry stack, not on the task stack. Fix the espfix64 #DF fixup to set up #GP according to TSS.SP0, rather than assuming that pt_regs + 1 == SP0. This won't change anything without an entry stack, but it will make the code continue to work when an entry stack is added.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b1ef4136616c6bd2a75d1fd2736d1d54437d65a8.1511497875.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index 2008dd0f8ccb..1bd43f044c62 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -359,7 +359,8 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) regs->cs == __KERNEL_CS && regs->ip == (unsigned long)native_irq_return_iret) { - struct pt_regs *normal_regs = task_pt_regs(current); + struct pt_regs *normal_regs = + (struct pt_regs *)this_cpu_read(cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp0) - 1; /* Fake a #GP(0) from userspace. */ memmove(&normal_regs->ip, (void *)regs->sp, 5*8); @@ -390,7 +391,7 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) * * Processors update CR2 whenever a page fault is detected. If a * second page fault occurs while an earlier page fault is being - * deliv- ered, the faulting linear address of the second fault will + * delivered, the faulting linear address of the second fault will * overwrite the contents of CR2 (replacing the previous * address). These updates to CR2 occur even if the page fault * results in a double fault or occurs during the delivery of a -- 2.14.1
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