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SubjectRe: [PATCH 09/12] x86/process: Pin the target stack in get_wchan()
On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 11:28:26AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 12:43 AM, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 03:44:37PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 7:00 PM, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> wrote:
> >> > On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 02:29:29PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> >> This will prevent a crash if get_wchan() runs after the task stack
> >> >> is freed.
> >> >
> >> > I think I found some more stuff. Have a look at KSTK_EIP() and KSTK_ESP(), I think
> >> > they read from the saved userspace registers area at the top of the kernel stack?
> >> >
> >> > Used on remote processes in:
> >> > vma_is_stack_for_task() (via /proc/$pid/maps)
> >>
> >> This isn't used in /proc/$pid/maps -- it's only used in
> >> /proc/$pid/task/$tid/maps. I wonder if anyone actually cares about it
> >> -- it certainly won't work reliably.
> >>
> >> I could pin the stack in vma_is_stack_for_task, but it seems
> >> potentially better to me to change it to vma_is_stack_for_current()
> >> and remove the offending caller in /proc, replacing it with "return
> >> 0". Thoughts?
> >
> > I just scrolled through the debian codesearch results for "\[stack\]" -
> > there seem to only be 105 across all of debian's packages, many of them
> > duplicates - and I didn't see any that looked like they used the tid map.
> > So I think this might work.
> >
> > ( https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=%22%5C%5Bstack%5C%5D%22 )
> >
> >
> >> > do_task_stat() (/proc/$pid/stat)
> >>
> >> Like this:
> >>
> >> mm = get_task_mm(task);
> >> if (mm) {
> >> vsize = task_vsize(mm);
> >> if (permitted) {
> >> eip = KSTK_EIP(task);
> >> esp = KSTK_ESP(task);
> >> }
> >> }
> >>
> >> Can we just delete this outright? It seems somewhere between mostly
> >> and entirely useless, and it also seems dangerous. Until very
> >> recently, on x86_64, this would have been a potential info leak, as
> >> SYSCALL followed closely by a hardware interrupt would cause *kernel*
> >> values to land in task_pt_regs(). I don't even want to think about
> >> what this code does if the task is in vm86 mode. I wouldn't be at all
> >> surprised if non-x86 architectures have all kinds of interesting
> >> thinks happen if you do this to a task that isn't running normal
> >> non-atomic kernel code at the time.
> >>
> >> I would advocate for unconditionally returning zeros in these two stat fields.
> >
> > I'd like that a lot.
> >
> > I guess the two things that might theoretically use it are ptrace users
> > and (very theoretically) sampling profiling stuff or so?
> >
> > In gdb, the only code I can find that reads this is in gdb/linux-nat.c, but
> > it's behind an "#ifdef 0":
> >
> > #if 0 /* Don't know how architecture-dependent the rest is...
> > Anyway the signal bitmap info is available from "status". */
> > if (fscanf (procfile, "%lu ", &ltmp) > 0) /* FIXME arch? */
> > printf_filtered (_("Kernel stack pointer: 0x%lx\n"), ltmp);
> > if (fscanf (procfile, "%lu ", &ltmp) > 0) /* FIXME arch? */
> > printf_filtered (_("Kernel instr pointer: 0x%lx\n"), ltmp);
> > [...]
> >
> > strace and ltrace don't seem to be using it.
>
> Does CRIU use this? I wouldn't expect so, since they're using ptrace,
> IIUC, to freeze/restore.

As far as I can tell:

parse_pid_stat() parses them into a struct proc_pid_stat as "esp" and "eip",
but those struct members are never used (like, probably, most other members
of that struct).

child_opened_proc.c just opens /proc/%d/stat and then closes it again
immediately.

So in summary: I don't think so.
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