Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 2 Aug 2016 10:14:56 +0200 | From | Ingo Molnar <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] x86/mm: Enable KASLR for vmemmap memory region (x86_64) |
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* Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 8:59 AM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote: > > Add vmemmap in the list of randomized memory regions. > > > > The vmemmap region holds a representation of the physical memory (through > > a struct page array). An attacker could use this region to disclose the > > kernel memory layout (walking the page linked list). > > > > Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > > --- > > Missing patch didn't pick-up by the tip bot on KASLR memory randomization. > > Resending after rebase on tip and tests as discussed with Ingo. > > Based on tip 4bcc8cf6ab5932cbb2511c8e18065e61b069f21c > > Ingo: Any comment? Can you integrate it on tip? > > > --- > > arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h | 1 + > > arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 4 +++- > > arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++- > > 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
After the merge window is over. There's no bad effect from the lack of this patch, other than lower level of randomization of kernel virtual addresses, right?
Thanks,
Ingo
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