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SubjectRe: [PATCH] x86/mm: Enable KASLR for vmemmap memory region (x86_64)

* Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 8:59 AM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote:
> > Add vmemmap in the list of randomized memory regions.
> >
> > The vmemmap region holds a representation of the physical memory (through
> > a struct page array). An attacker could use this region to disclose the
> > kernel memory layout (walking the page linked list).
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > ---
> > Missing patch didn't pick-up by the tip bot on KASLR memory randomization.
> > Resending after rebase on tip and tests as discussed with Ingo.
> > Based on tip 4bcc8cf6ab5932cbb2511c8e18065e61b069f21c
>
> Ingo: Any comment? Can you integrate it on tip?
>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h | 1 +
> > arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 4 +++-
> > arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

After the merge window is over. There's no bad effect from the lack of this patch,
other than lower level of randomization of kernel virtual addresses, right?

Thanks,

Ingo

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