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SubjectRe: bio linked list corruption.
On 23 November 2016 at 20:58, Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 02:34:19PM -0500, Dave Jones wrote:
>
> > [ 317.689216] BUG: Bad page state in process kworker/u8:8 pfn:4d8fd4
> > trace from just before this happened. Does this shed any light ?
> >
> > https://codemonkey.org.uk/junk/trace.txt
>
> crap, I just noticed the timestamps in the trace come from quite a bit
> later. I'll tweak the code to do the taint checking/ftrace stop after
> every syscall, that should narrow the window some more.

FWIW I hit this as well:

BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffff81ff08b7
IP: [<ffffffff8135f2ea>] __lock_acquire.isra.32+0xda/0x1a30
PGD 461e067 PUD 461f063
PMD 1e001e1
Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
CPU: 0 PID: 21744 Comm: trinity-c56 Tainted: G B 4.9.0-rc7+ #217
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
task: ffff8801ee924080 task.stack: ffff8801bab88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8135f2ea>] [<ffffffff8135f2ea>]
__lock_acquire.isra.32+0xda/0x1a30
RSP: 0018:ffff8801bab8f730 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: ffffffff81ff071f RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff85ae7d00
RBP: ffff8801bab8f7b0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8801e727fc40 R11: fffffbfff0b54ced R12: ffffffff85ae7d00
R13: ffffffff84912920 R14: ffff8801ee924080 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f37ee653700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffff81ff08b7 CR3: 00000001daa70000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 00007f37ee465000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff8801ee9247d0 0000000000000000 0000000100000000 ffff8801ee924080
ffff8801f6a201c0 ffff8801f6a201c0 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
ffff880100000000 ffff880100000000 ffff8801e727fc40 ffff8801ee924080
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81361751>] lock_acquire+0x141/0x2b0
[<ffffffff813530c0>] ? finish_wait+0xb0/0x180
[<ffffffff83c95b29>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x49/0x60
[<ffffffff813530c0>] ? finish_wait+0xb0/0x180
[<ffffffff813530c0>] finish_wait+0xb0/0x180
[<ffffffff81576227>] shmem_fault+0x4c7/0x6b0
[<ffffffff83a9b7cd>] ? p9_client_rpc+0x13d/0xf40
[<ffffffff81575d60>] ? shmem_getpage_gfp+0x1c90/0x1c90
[<ffffffff81fbe777>] ? radix_tree_next_chunk+0x4f7/0x840
[<ffffffff81352150>] ? wake_atomic_t_function+0x210/0x210
[<ffffffff815ad316>] __do_fault+0x206/0x410
[<ffffffff815ad110>] ? do_page_mkwrite+0x320/0x320
[<ffffffff815b9bcf>] handle_mm_fault+0x1cef/0x2a60
[<ffffffff815b8012>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x132/0x2a60
[<ffffffff815b7ee0>] ? __pmd_alloc+0x370/0x370
[<ffffffff81692e7e>] ? inode_add_bytes+0x10e/0x160
[<ffffffff8162de11>] ? memset+0x31/0x40
[<ffffffff815cba10>] ? find_vma+0x30/0x150
[<ffffffff812373a2>] __do_page_fault+0x452/0x9f0
[<ffffffff81ff071f>] ? iov_iter_init+0xaf/0x1d0
[<ffffffff81237bf5>] trace_do_page_fault+0x1e5/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8122a007>] do_async_page_fault+0x27/0xa0
[<ffffffff83c97618>] async_page_fault+0x28/0x30
[<ffffffff82059341>] ? strnlen_user+0x91/0x1a0
[<ffffffff8205931e>] ? strnlen_user+0x6e/0x1a0
[<ffffffff8157e038>] strndup_user+0x28/0xb0
[<ffffffff81d83c17>] SyS_add_key+0xc7/0x370
[<ffffffff81d83b50>] ? key_get_type_from_user.constprop.6+0xd0/0xd0
[<ffffffff815143ea>] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.4+0x3a/0x1e0
[<ffffffff81d83b50>] ? key_get_type_from_user.constprop.6+0xd0/0xd0
[<ffffffff8100524f>] do_syscall_64+0x1af/0x4d0
[<ffffffff83c96534>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Code: 89 4d b8 44 89 45 c0 89 4d c8 4c 89 55 d0 e8 ee c3 ff ff 48 85
c0 4c 8b 55 d0 8b 4d c8 44 8b 45 c0 4c 8b 4d b8 0f 84 c6 01 00 00 <3e>
ff 80 98 01 00 00 49 8d be 48 07 00 00 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00
RIP [<ffffffff8135f2ea>] __lock_acquire.isra.32+0xda/0x1a30

I didn't read all the emails in this thread, the crash site looks
identical to one of the earlier traces although the caller may be
different.

I think you can rule out btrfs in any case, probably block layer as
well, since it looks like this comes from shmem.


Vegard

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