Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring | From | Mimi Zohar <> | Date | Thu, 07 Jan 2016 10:31:16 -0500 |
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On Thu, 2016-01-07 at 00:34 +0000, David Howells wrote: > David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote: > > > Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893: > > > > Author: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> > > Date: Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200 > > IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings > > > > The problem is that prep->trusted is a simple boolean and the additional > > x509_validate_trust() call doesn't therefore distinguish levels of > > trustedness, but is just OR'd with the result of validation against the > > system trusted keyring. > > > > However, setting the trusted flag means that this key may be added to *any* > > trusted-only keyring - including the system trusted keyring. > > > > Whilst I appreciate what the patch is trying to do, I don't think this is > > quite the right solution. > > Please apply this to security/next.
The only upstreamed trusted keyrings are the system keyring, which does not permit user space to write to the keyring, and the 3 IMA keyrings.
For those systems without the Kconfig IMA_MOK_KEYRING option enabled, get_ima_mok_keyring() does not change the existing behavior. For systems with IMA_MOK_KEYRING enabled, keys being added to the IMA keyring, can be validated against the system keyring or the IMA MOK keyring.
Mimi
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