lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2015]   [Sep]   [28]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
/
Subject[PATCH 25/25] x86, pkeys: Documentation
From
Date

From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>


Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
---

b/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 54 insertions(+)

diff -puN /dev/null Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
--- /dev/null 2015-07-13 14:24:11.435656502 -0700
+++ b/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt 2015-09-28 11:40:16.120555350 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a CPU feature
+which will be found on future Intel CPUs.
+
+Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based
+protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables
+when an application changes protection domains. It works by
+dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table entry to a
+"protection key", giving 16 possible keys.
+
+There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate
+bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key. Being a CPU
+register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each
+thread a different set of protections from every other thread.
+
+There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing
+to the new register. The feature is only available in 64-bit mode,
+even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs. These
+permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
+instruction fetches.
+
+The kernel attempts to make protection keys consistent with the
+behavior of a plain mprotect(). For instance if you do this:
+
+ mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE);
+ something(ptr);
+
+you can expect the same effects with protection keys when doing this:
+
+ mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE);
+ set_pkey(ptr, size, 4);
+ wrpkru(0xffffff3f); // access disable pkey 4
+ something(ptr);
+
+That should be true whether something() is a direct access to 'ptr'
+like:
+
+ *ptr = foo;
+
+or when the kernel does the access on the application's behalf like
+with a read():
+
+ read(fd, ptr, 1);
+
+The kernel will send a SIGSEGV in both cases, but si_code will be set
+to SEGV_PKERR when violating protection keys versus SEGV_ACCERR when
+the plain mprotect() permissions are violated.
+
+=========================== Config Option ===========================
+
+This config option adds approximately 1.5kb of text. and 50 bytes of
+data to the executable. A workload which does large O_DIRECT reads
+of holes in XFS files was run to exercise get_user_pages_fast(). No
+performance delta was observed with the config option
+enabled or disabled.
_

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2015-09-28 21:41    [W:0.780 / U:1.008 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site