Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 net-next 1/3] bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs | From | Alexei Starovoitov <> | Date | Fri, 9 Oct 2015 10:59:23 -0700 |
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On 10/9/15 10:45 AM, Daniel Borkmann wrote: > On 10/09/2015 07:30 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote: > ... >> Openstack use case is different. There it will be prog_type_sched_cls >> that can mangle packets, change skb metadata, etc under TC framework. >> These are not suitable for all users and this patch leaves >> them root-only. If you're proposing to add CAP_BPF_TC to let containers >> use them without being CAP_SYS_ADMIN, then I agree, it is useful, but >> needs a lot more safety analysis on tc side. > > Well, I think if so, then this would need to be something generic for > tc instead of being specific to a single (out of various) entities > inside the tc framework, but I currently doubt that this makes much > sense. If we allow to operate already at that level, then restricting > to CAP_SYS_ADMIN makes more sense in that specific context/subsys to me.
Let me rephrase. I think it would be useful, but I have my doubts that it's manageable, since analyzing dark corners of TC is not trivial. Probably easier to allow prog_type_sched_cls/act under CAP_NET_ADMIN and grant that to trusted apps. Though only tiny bit better than requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
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