Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 8 Jan 2015 20:18:13 +0100 | From | Oleg Nesterov <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH RFC] Allow introspection to already attached ptracer in __ptrace_may_access |
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On 01/08, Stijn Volckaert wrote: > > From that point onwards, the debugger can no longer perform any > operations that go through __ptrace_may_access. These include > process_vm_{read,write}v but also PTRACE_{POKE,PEEK}{TEXT,DATA}.
PTRACE_POKE/PEEK should work? not that this really matters...
> I don't see > how Yama can possibly tell that tracee B and the debugger are still related > at this point so I see no easy fix for this.
Well, perhaps yama can also have PR_SET_PTRACEE, I dunno.
> Patching __ptrace_may_access > might indeed not be a good idea as it is used to check for credentials to > perform a bunch of other non-ptrace operations throughout the kernel.
Just add the "ptrace_parent(task) == current" check into ptracer_exception_found() ?
> The possible solutions that I can see right now are: > 1) Adding some sort of original_parent field to task_struct, just for the > sake of relationship tracking
And what should we do with this pointer if original_parent exits?
> 2) Changing the credentials check in process_vm_{read,write}v only so that > you don't go all the way into __ptrace_may_access if you're already attached > as a ptracer
This really doesn't look good, imo.
Oleg.
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