Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 22 Dec 2014 21:03:26 +0100 (CET) | From | Jiri Kosina <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] ASLRv3: randomize_va_space=3 preventing offset2lib attack |
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On Mon, 22 Dec 2014, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> It could be worth having a mode that goes all out: randomize every > single allocation independently in, say, a 45 or 46-byte range. That > would be about as strong ASLR as we could possibly have, it would > result in guard intervals around mmap data allocations (which has real > value), and it would still leave plenty of space for big address space > hogs like the Chromium sandbox. > > The main downside would be lots of memory used for page tables.
Plus get_random_int() during every mmap() call. Plus the resulting VA space fragmentation.
-- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
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