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SubjectRe: [PATCH 3/3] X86: Add a thread cpu time implementation to vDSO

* Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 2:56 PM, Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 02:13:23PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 1:57 PM, Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com> wrote:
> >> > On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 11:10:52AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> >> On Sun, Dec 7, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com> wrote:
> >> >> > This primarily speeds up clock_gettime(CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID, ..). We
> >> >> > use the following method to compute the thread cpu time:
> >> >>
> >> >> I like the idea, and I like making this type of profiling fast. I
> >> >> don't love the implementation because it's an information leak (maybe
> >> >> we don't care) and it's ugly.
> >> >>
> >> >> The info leak could be fixed completely by having a per-process array
> >> >> instead of a global array. That's currently tricky without wasting
> >> >> memory, but it could be created on demand if we wanted to do that,
> >> >> once my vvar .fault patches go in (assuming they do -- I need to ping
> >> >> the linux-mm people).
> >> >
> >> > those info leak really doesn't matter.
> >>
> >> Why not?
> >
> > Ofcourse I can't make sure completely, but how could this
> > info be used as attack?
>
> It may leak interesting timing info, even from cpus that are
> outside your affinity mask / cpuset. I don't know how much
> anyone actually cares.

Finegraned timing information has been successfully used to
recover secret keys (and sometimes even coarse timing
information), so it can be a security issue in certain setups.

Thanks,

Ingo


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