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SubjectRe: [PATCH] printk: Check real user/group id for %pK
> Right, so the pppd application is actually doing the correct thing.

And a CAP_SYSLOG setuid binary that *doesn't* DTRT seems like a more
immediate security hole than leaking kernel addresses. After all
kptr_restrict is optional precisely because the benefit is marginal.

The interesting question is what credentials make sense for %pK outside
of a seq_printf(). Does it even make sense in a generic printk? In that
case, it's the permission of the syslogd that matters rather than the
process generating the message.

> Will wait and see what others have to say.

Me, too. Dan in particular.


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