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SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot
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* joeyli:

> Yes, Matthew raised this concern at before. I modified patch to load
> private key in efi stub kernel, before ExitBootServices(), that means we
> don't need generate key-pair at every system boot. So, the above
> procedure of efi bootloader will only run one time.

But if you don't generate fresh keys on every boot, the persistent
keys are mor exposed to other UEFI applications. Correct me if I'm
wrong, but I don't think UEFI variables are segregated between
different UEFI applications, so if anyone gets a generic UEFI variable
dumper (or setter) signed by the trusted key, this cryptographic
validation of hibernate snapshots is bypassable.


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