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    SubjectRe: [Part1 PATCH 00/22] Add namespace support for audit
    Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@redhat.com):
    > On Thu, 2013-06-20 at 11:02 +0800, Gao feng wrote:
    > > On 06/20/2013 04:51 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
    > > > On Wed, 2013-06-19 at 16:49 -0400, Aristeu Rozanski wrote:
    > > >> On Wed, Jun 19, 2013 at 09:53:32AM +0800, Gao feng wrote:
    > > >>> This patchset is first part of namespace support for audit.
    > > >>> in this patchset, the mainly resources of audit system have
    > > >>> been isolated. the audit filter, rules havn't been isolated
    > > >>> now. It will be implemented in Part2. We finished the isolation
    > > >>> of user audit message in this patchset.
    > > >>>
    > > >>> I choose to assign audit to the user namespace.
    > > >>> Right now,there are six kinds of namespaces, such as
    > > >>> net, mount, ipc, pid, uts and user. the first five
    > > >>> namespaces have special usage. the audit isn't suitable to
    > > >>> belong to these five namespaces, And since the flag of system
    > > >>> call clone is in short supply, we can't provide a new flag such
    > > >>> as CLONE_NEWAUDIT to enable audit namespace separately. so the
    > > >>> user namespace may be the best choice.
    > > >>
    > > >> I thought it was said on the last submission that to tie userns and
    > > >> audit namespace would be a bad idea?
    > > >
    > > > I consider it a non-starter. unpriv users are allowed to launch their
    > > > own user namespace. The whole point of audit is to have only a priv
    > > > user be allowed to make changes. If you tied audit namespace to user
    > > > namespace you grant an unpriv user the ability to modify audit.
    > > >
    > >
    > > I understand your views.
    > >
    > > But ven the unpriv user are allowed to make changes, they can do no harm.
    > > they can only make changes on the audit namespace they created.they can
    > > only communicate with the audit namespace they created.
    >
    > Imagine I set up my machine to audit all user access to super secret
    > information. With your patch set all an malicious user has to do is
    > create a new user namespace. Now when he accesses the super secret
    > information it will be logged inside the user namespace he created. So
    > he can just dump those logs in the trash.

    Right, I thought I'd pointed this out last time - it makes LSPP
    certification impossible.

    > I believe that each audit namespace should require priv
    > (CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL) in the user namespace that created the current audit
    > namespace. So lets say the machine boots and we are in the init_user

    The problem with this is that ... people will then hand out
    CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL :)

    I'd be happier with Eric Biederman's suggestion: You can create a new
    audit namespace, but all of the initial audit namespace's filters still
    (separately) apply to you.

    -serge


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