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SubjectRe: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries
On Fri, Mar 01, 2013 at 12:45:23AM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Thu, 28 Feb 2013, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > Sure, if you've been infected before the revocation, you'll still be
> > infected. There's not really any good way around that.
>
> Which is a very substantial difference to normal X509 chain of trust,
> isn't it?

If you've loaded an x.509 certificate into the kernel and it's later
revoked, any module signed with the key is going to be loadable until
it's revoked. I don't see an especially large difference here?

--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org


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