[lkml]   [2012]   [Jul]   [7]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
SubjectRe: [PATCH 07/12] random: use the arch-specific rng in xfer_secondary_pool
On Sat, 2012-07-07 at 21:41 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 08, 2012 at 02:06:46AM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> >
> > Surely the number of random bytes being added is i * sizeof(long), not
> > sizeof(u.hwrand)?
> >
> Meh; Kees Cook has made the same observation. Basically, in the
> unlikely case where RDRAND fails, we'll end up mixing in stack
> garbage. It's not a security vulnerability, since the contents of the
> entropy pool never gets exposed. In fact, one could argue that mixing
> in some unknown garbage from the kernel stack might actually help a
> little; but it can't hurt.

Sorry, I realised after reading further that there's no entropy being
credited. However, I expect that kmemcheck will complain unless you
limit the used length or call kmemcheck_mark_initialized().


Ben Hutchings
Life would be so much easier if we could look at the source code.
[unhandled content-type:application/pgp-signature]
 \ /
  Last update: 2012-07-08 04:41    [W:0.047 / U:6.680 seconds]
©2003-2018 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site