[lkml]   [2012]   [Jul]   [7]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
    SubjectRe: [PATCH 07/12] random: use the arch-specific rng in xfer_secondary_pool
    On Sat, 2012-07-07 at 21:41 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
    > On Sun, Jul 08, 2012 at 02:06:46AM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
    > >
    > > Surely the number of random bytes being added is i * sizeof(long), not
    > > sizeof(u.hwrand)?
    > >
    > Meh; Kees Cook has made the same observation. Basically, in the
    > unlikely case where RDRAND fails, we'll end up mixing in stack
    > garbage. It's not a security vulnerability, since the contents of the
    > entropy pool never gets exposed. In fact, one could argue that mixing
    > in some unknown garbage from the kernel stack might actually help a
    > little; but it can't hurt.

    Sorry, I realised after reading further that there's no entropy being
    credited. However, I expect that kmemcheck will complain unless you
    limit the used length or call kmemcheck_mark_initialized().


    Ben Hutchings
    Life would be so much easier if we could look at the source code.
    [unhandled content-type:application/pgp-signature]
     \ /
      Last update: 2012-07-08 04:41    [W:0.024 / U:41.940 seconds]
    ©2003-2016 Jasper Spaans. hosted at Digital OceanAdvertise on this site