lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2012]   [Jul]   [7]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [PATCH 07/12] random: use the arch-specific rng in xfer_secondary_pool
On Sun, Jul 08, 2012 at 02:06:46AM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
>
> Surely the number of random bytes being added is i * sizeof(long), not
> sizeof(u.hwrand)?
>

Meh; Kees Cook has made the same observation. Basically, in the
unlikely case where RDRAND fails, we'll end up mixing in stack
garbage. It's not a security vulnerability, since the contents of the
entropy pool never gets exposed. In fact, one could argue that mixing
in some unknown garbage from the kernel stack might actually help a
little; but it can't hurt.

- Ted


\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2012-07-08 04:21    [W:0.092 / U:0.156 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site