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SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call
On 05/24/2012 04:43 PM, Andrew Lutomirski wrote:
> IMO the behavior should change. Alternatively, a post-ptrace syscall
> should have to pass the *tracer's* seccomp filter, but that seems
> overcomplicated and confusing.
> OTOH, allowing ptrace in a seccomp filter is asking for trouble anyway
> -- if you can ptrace something outside the sandbox, you've escaped.

This is my suggestion: if there is demand, make it possible to install a
*second* seccomp filter program which is run on the result of the
ptrace. I.e.:

Untraced: process -> seccomp1 -> kernel

Traced: process -> seccomp1 -> ptrace -> seccomp2 -> kernel

This is something we could add later if there is demand.


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