Messages in this thread |  | | | Date | Fri, 25 May 2012 09:40:18 +1000 (EST) | | From | James Morris <> | | Subject | Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call |
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On Thu, 24 May 2012, Will Drewry wrote:
> As is, the biggest benefit of this change is just setting consistent > expectations in what the ptrace/seccomp interactions should be. The > current ability for ptrace to "bypass" secure computing (by remapping > allowed system calls) is not necessarily a problem, but it is not > necessarily intuitive behavior.
Indeed -- while the purpose of seccomp is to reduce the attack surface of the syscall interface, if a user allows ptrace, attackers will definitely see that as an attack vector, if it allows them to increase that attack surface.
It at least needs to be well-documented.
-- James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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