Messages in this thread |  | | | Date | Thu, 24 May 2012 15:00:57 -0700 | | From | Andrew Morton <> | | Subject | Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call |
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On Thu, 24 May 2012 11:07:58 -0500 Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:
> This is an RFC based on the comments from Al Viro and Eric Paris > regarding ptrace()rs being able to change the system call the kernel > sees after the seccomp enforcement has occurred (for mode 1 or 2).
Perhaps you could repeat those comments in this changelog.
> With this series applied, a (p)tracer of a process with seccomp enabled > will be unable to change the tracee's system call number after the > secure computing check has been performed. > > The x86 change is tested, as is the seccomp.c change. For other arches, > it is not (RFC :). Given that there are other inconsistencies in this > code across architectures, I'm not sure if it makes sense to attempt to > fix them all at once or to roll through as I attempt to add seccomp > filter support. > > As is, the biggest benefit of this change is just setting consistent > expectations in what the ptrace/seccomp interactions should be. The > current ability for ptrace to "bypass" secure computing (by remapping > allowed system calls) is not necessarily a problem, but it is not > necessarily intuitive behavior. >
Because my take on the above reasoning is "why did you bother writing these patches"!
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