lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2012]   [Apr]   [6]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:46 -0500
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:

> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
>
> With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc)
> become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of
> subverting privileged binaries.
>
> This patch completely breaks apparmor. Someone who understands (and
> uses) apparmor should fix it or at least give me a hint.

So [patch 2/15] fixes all this up?

I guess we should join the two patches into one, to avoid a silly
breakage window. That means that John loses a brownie point, but we
can mention him in the changelog, include his signed-off-by:

> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>

Several of these patches are missing your signed-off-by:. They should
all have your SOB, because you sent them.
Documentation/SubmittingPatches explains this.

I'm trying to find a way to merge all this code without reviewing it ;)
Alas, this is against my rules. Given the length of time for which
this patchset has been floating around, I'm a little surprised by the
lack of acked-by's and reviewed-by's. Have you been gathering them all
up? Are the networking guys all happy about this patchset?




\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2012-04-06 21:51    [from the cache]
©2003-2014 Jasper Spaans. Advertise on this site