lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2012]   [Apr]   [19]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
/
Date
From
Subject[ 65/68] futex: Do not leak robust list to unprivileged process
3.2-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit bdbb776f882f5ad431aa1e694c69c1c3d6a4a5b8 upstream.

It was possible to extract the robust list head address from a setuid
process if it had used set_robust_list(), allowing an ASLR info leak. This
changes the permission checks to be the same as those used for similar
info that comes out of /proc.

Running a setuid program that uses robust futexes would have had:
cred->euid != pcred->euid
cred->euid == pcred->uid
so the old permissions check would allow it. I'm not aware of any setuid
programs that use robust futexes, so this is just a preventative measure.

(This patch is based on changes from grsecurity.)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: spender@grsecurity.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120319231253.GA20893@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
kernel/futex.c | 36 +++++++++++++-----------------------
kernel/futex_compat.c | 36 +++++++++++++-----------------------
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>

#include <asm/futex.h>

@@ -2443,40 +2444,29 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pi
{
struct robust_list_head __user *head;
unsigned long ret;
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred;
+ struct task_struct *p;

if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;

+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ ret = -ESRCH;
if (!pid)
- head = current->robust_list;
+ p = current;
else {
- struct task_struct *p;
-
- ret = -ESRCH;
- rcu_read_lock();
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
goto err_unlock;
- ret = -EPERM;
- pcred = __task_cred(p);
- /* If victim is in different user_ns, then uids are not
- comparable, so we must have CAP_SYS_PTRACE */
- if (cred->user->user_ns != pcred->user->user_ns) {
- if (!ns_capable(pcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
- goto err_unlock;
- goto ok;
- }
- /* If victim is in same user_ns, then uids are comparable */
- if (cred->euid != pcred->euid &&
- cred->euid != pcred->uid &&
- !ns_capable(pcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
- goto err_unlock;
-ok:
- head = p->robust_list;
- rcu_read_unlock();
}

+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ goto err_unlock;
+
+ head = p->robust_list;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
return put_user(head, head_ptr);
--- a/kernel/futex_compat.c
+++ b/kernel/futex_compat.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/futex.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>

#include <asm/uaccess.h>

@@ -136,40 +137,29 @@ compat_sys_get_robust_list(int pid, comp
{
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head;
unsigned long ret;
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred;
+ struct task_struct *p;

if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;

+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ ret = -ESRCH;
if (!pid)
- head = current->compat_robust_list;
+ p = current;
else {
- struct task_struct *p;
-
- ret = -ESRCH;
- rcu_read_lock();
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
goto err_unlock;
- ret = -EPERM;
- pcred = __task_cred(p);
- /* If victim is in different user_ns, then uids are not
- comparable, so we must have CAP_SYS_PTRACE */
- if (cred->user->user_ns != pcred->user->user_ns) {
- if (!ns_capable(pcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
- goto err_unlock;
- goto ok;
- }
- /* If victim is in same user_ns, then uids are comparable */
- if (cred->euid != pcred->euid &&
- cred->euid != pcred->uid &&
- !ns_capable(pcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
- goto err_unlock;
-ok:
- head = p->compat_robust_list;
- rcu_read_unlock();
}

+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ goto err_unlock;
+
+ head = p->compat_robust_list;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
return put_user(ptr_to_compat(head), head_ptr);



\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2012-04-19 23:21    [W:0.209 / U:1.476 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site