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    SubjectRe: [RFC][PATCH 0/3] add FALLOC_FL_NO_HIDE_STALE flag in fallocate
    On Tue, Apr 17, 2012 at 01:59:37PM -0400, Ric Wheeler wrote:
    >
    > You could get both security and avoid the run time hit by fully
    > writing the file or by having a variation that relied on "discard"
    > (i.e., no need to zero data if we can discard or track it as
    > unwritten).

    It's certainly the case that if the device supports persistent
    discard, something which we definitely *should* do is to send the
    discard at fallocate time and then mark the space as initialized.

    Unfortunately, not all devices, and in particular no HDD's for which I
    aware support persistent discard. And, writing all zero's to the file
    is in fact what a number of programs for which I am aware (including
    an enterprise database) are doing, precisely because they tend to
    write into the fallocated space in a somewhat random order, and the
    extent conversion costs is in fact quite significant. But writing all
    zero's to the file before you can use it is quite costly; at the very
    least it burns disk bandwidth --- one of the main motivations of
    fallocate was to avoid needing to do a "write all zero pass", and
    while it does solve the problem for some use cases (such as DVR's),
    it's not a complete solution.

    Whether or not it is a security issue is debateable. If using the
    fallocate flag requires CAP_SYS_RAWIO, and the process has to
    explicitly ask for the privilege, a process with those privileges can
    directly access memory and I/O ports directly, via the ioperm(2) and
    iopl(2) system calls. So I think it's possible to be a bit nuanced
    over whether or not this is as horrible as you might think.

    Ultimately, if there are application programmers who are really
    desperate for that the last bit of performance, they can always use
    FIBMAP/FIEMAP and then read/write directly to the block device. (And
    no, that's not a theoretical example.) I think it is a worthwhile
    goal to provide file system interfaces that allow a trusted process
    which has the appropriate security capabilities to do things in a
    safer way than that.

    Regards,

    - Ted


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