Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 20 Mar 2012 00:02:44 +0100 | Subject | Re: [patch 1/2] c/r: prctl: Add ability to set new mm_struct::exe_file | From | richard -rw- weinberger <> |
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On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 11:46 PM, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> wrote: > Well, let's discuss this more completely. In what ways could an > attacker use this? How serious is the problem? What actions can be > taken to lessen it? etcetera.
After considering the problem a bit more I think it's not a big problem. We must not trust /proc/pid/exe in anyway. An attacker can always execute another binary without calling execve().
So, why makes that one-short fashion the feature more secure? Let the user change the exe symlink as often as he wants. From a security point of view the exe symlink is anyway useless.
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