| | Date | Sun, 05 Feb 2012 23:10:40 +0100 | | From | Willy Tarreau <> | | Subject | [PATCH 51/91] Bluetooth: Prevent buffer overflow in l2cap config request |
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2.6.27-longterm review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------ commit 7ac28817536797fd40e9646452183606f9e17f71 upstream.
A remote user can provide a small value for the command size field in the command header of an l2cap configuration request, resulting in an integer underflow when subtracting the size of the configuration request header. This results in copying a very large amount of data via memcpy() and destroying the kernel heap. Check for underflow.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> --- net/bluetooth/l2cap.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) Index: longterm-2.6.27/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c =================================================================== --- longterm-2.6.27.orig/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c 2012-02-05 22:34:33.464915011 +0100 +++ longterm-2.6.27/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c 2012-02-05 22:34:42.135914462 +0100 @@ -1737,7 +1737,7 @@ /* Reject if config buffer is too small. */ len = cmd_len - sizeof(*req); - if (l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_len + len > sizeof(l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_req)) { + if (len < 0 || l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_len + len > sizeof(l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_req)) { l2cap_send_cmd(conn, cmd->ident, L2CAP_CONF_RSP, l2cap_build_conf_rsp(sk, rsp, L2CAP_CONF_REJECT, flags), rsp);
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