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    SubjectRe: [PATCH v6 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF
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    On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 7:32 AM, Serge E. Hallyn
    <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> wrote:
    > Quoting Will Drewry (wad@chromium.org):
    >> [This patch depends on luto@mit.edu's no_new_privs patch:
    >>  https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/12/446
    >> ]
    >>
    >> This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2.  This mode enables dynamic
    >> enforcement of system call filtering policy in the kernel as specified
    >> by a userland task.  The policy is expressed in terms of a Berkeley
    >> Packet Filter program, as is used for userland-exposed socket filtering.
    >> Instead of network data, the BPF program is evaluated over struct
    >> seccomp_filter_data at the time of the system call.
    >>
    >> A filter program may be installed by a userland task by calling
    >>   prctl(PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER, &fprog);
    >> where fprog is of type struct sock_fprog.
    >>
    >> If the first filter program allows subsequent prctl(2) calls, then
    >> additional filter programs may be attached.  All attached programs
    >> must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to proceed.
    >>
    >> To avoid CONFIG_COMPAT related landmines, once a filter program is
    >> installed using specific is_compat_task() value, it is not allowed to
    >> make system calls using the alternate entry point.
    >>
    >> Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve, however
    >> the installation of filters must be preceded by setting 'no_new_privs'
    >> to ensure that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect
    >> privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary).  Tasks with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
    >> in their namespace may install inheritable filters without setting
    >> the no_new_privs bit.
    >>
    >> There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are
    >> as follows:
    >> - BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time.
    >> - Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired
    >>   arguments
    >> - No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible.
    >> - system call arguments are loaded on demand only to minimize copying
    >>   required for system call number-only policy decisions.
    >>
    >> This patch includes its own BPF evaluator, but relies on the
    >> net/core/filter.c BPF checking code.  It is possible to share
    >> evaluators, but the performance sensitive nature of the network
    >> filtering path makes it an iterative optimization which (I think :) can
    >> be tackled separately via separate patchsets. (And at some point sharing
    >> BPF JIT code!)
    >>
    >>  v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure
    >>      - require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter
    >>        installation. (luto@mit.edu)
    >>      - s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions
    >>        (amwang@redhat.com)
    >>      - cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@redhat.com)
    >>      - on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something)
    >>  v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments
    >>        (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com, mcgrathr@chromium.org)
    >>      - uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to
    >>        handle endianness.  Compromises between the two alternate
    >>        proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for
    >>        endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof().
    >>        (mcgrathr@chromium.org, indan@nul.nu)
    >>      - update Kconfig description
    >>      - add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation
    >>      - (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading
    >>      - drop seccomp_t (eparis@redhat.com)
    >>  v4: - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
    >>      - now uses current->no_new_privs
    >>          (luto@mit.edu,torvalds@linux-foundation.com)
    >>      - assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
    >>      - fix style issues (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
    >>      - reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
    >>  v3: - macros to inline (oleg@redhat.com)
    >>      - init_task behavior fixed (oleg@redhat.com)
    >>      - drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@redhat.com)
    >>      - alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@canonical.com)
    >>      - adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per
    >>        torvalds@linux-foundation.org and luto@mit.edu
    >>  v2: - (patch 2 only)
    >>
    >> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
    >
    > Hi Will,
    >
    > as far as I can tell based on changelog I suspect you could have
    > kept my Acked-by (from v3?).  However, I'll wait until your next
    > submission (as I see there were a few change requests), and do a
    > final complete new review of that.

    Thanks, Serge! I just failed at the proper protocol and didn't mean
    to not include your Acked-by. However, I am changing a fair amount
    of the internals this time around, so I'll be happy to have another
    full review.

    > Thanks for continuing to push on this.

    Definitely! I've been traveling this week, so it's been a bit slow
    going, but I hope to have the next rev up early next week if not
    sooner.

    Cheers!
    will
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