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SubjectRe: [RFC][PATCH] Fix cap_capable to only allow owners in the parent user namespace to have caps.
On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 2:39 PM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
>
> Andy Lutomirski pointed out that the current behavior of allowing the
> owner of a user namespace to have all caps when that owner is not in a
> parent user namespace is wrong.
>
> This is a bug introduced by the kuid conversion which made it possible
> for the owner of a user namespace to live in a child user namespace. I
> goofed and totally missed this implication.
>
> Serge and can you please take a look and see if my corrected cap_capable
> reads correctly to you.
>
> Andy or anyone else that wants to give me a second eyeball and double
> check me on this I would appreciate it.
>
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
>
> ---
>
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 6dbae46..4639f44 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -70,37 +70,44 @@ int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> *
> * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
> * and has_capability() functions. That is, it has the reverse semantics:
> * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
> * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
> */
> int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
> int cap, int audit)
> {
> for (;;) {
> - /* The owner of the user namespace has all caps. */
> - if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && uid_eq(targ_ns->owner, cred->euid))
> - return 0;
> + struct user_namespace *parent_ns;
>
> /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
> if (targ_ns == cred->user_ns)
> return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
>
> /* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */
> if (targ_ns == &init_user_ns)
> return -EPERM;
>
> + parent_ns = targ_ns->parent;
> +
> + /*
> + * The owner of the user namespace in the parent user
> + * namespace has all caps.
> + */
> + if ((parent_ns == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(targ_ns->owner, cred->euid))
> + return 0;

This is confusing enough that I can't immediately tell whether it's
correct. I think it's close but out of order.

Should this be transitive? I.e. suppose uid 1 owns a child of
init_user_ns and uid 2 (mapped in the first ns as the identity) owns
an inner ns. Does uid 2 in the root ns have all caps inside? I'd say
no, but I don't have a great argument for that. But uid 1 presumably
does have caps because it could enter the parent with setns, then
change uid, then enter the child.

How about (severely whitespace damaged):

int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
int cap, int audit)
{
struct user_namespace *here = targ_ns;

/* Walk up the namespace hierarchy until we find our own namespace. */
for (;;) {
/* The owner of an ancestor namespace has all caps, if
that owner is in the parent ns. */
if (cred->user_ns == here->parent &&
uid_eq(targ_ns->owner, cred->euid))
return 0;

/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
if (here == cred->user_ns)
return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ?
0 : -EPERM;

/* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */
if (here == &init_user_ns)
return -EPERM;
else
here = targ_ns->parent;
}
}

--Andy


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