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SubjectRe: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
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On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> wrote:
> On Mon, 29 Oct 2012, Matthew Garrett wrote:
>
>> > > This is pretty much identical to the first patchset, but with the capability
>> > > renamed (CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) and the kexec patch dropped. If anyone wants
>> > > to deploy these then they should disable kexec until support for signed
>> > > kexec payloads has been merged.
>> >
>> > Apparently your patchset currently doesn't handle device firmware loading,
>> > nor do you seem to mention in in the comments.
>>
>> Correct.
>>
>> > I believe signed firmware loading should be put on plate as well, right?
>>
>> I think that's definitely something that should be covered. I hadn't
>> worried about it immediately as any attack would be limited to machines
>> with a specific piece of hardware, and the attacker would need to expend
>> a significant amount of reverse engineering work on the firmware - and
>> we'd probably benefit from them doing that in the long run...
>
> Now -- how about resuming from S4?
>
> Reading stored memory image (potentially tampered before reboot) from disk
> is basically DMA-ing arbitrary data over the whole RAM. I am currently not
> able to imagine a scenario how this could be made "secure" (without
> storing private keys to sign the hibernation image on the machine itself
> which, well, doesn't sound secure either).

I have a patch that disables that. I imagine it will be included in the
next submission of the patchset.

You can find it here in the meantime:

http://jwboyer.fedorapeople.org/pub/0001-hibernate-Disable-in-a-Secure-Boot-environment.patch

josh


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