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    SubjectRe: [PATCH v5 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF
    On Sat, Jan 28, 2012 at 8:28 AM, Andrew Lutomirski <> wrote:
    > On Fri, Jan 27, 2012 at 3:24 PM, Will Drewry <> wrote:
    >> Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve.
    >> However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged
    >> (!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task.  This
    >> ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect
    >> privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary).
    > This makes me nervous -- I don't think that the behavior of any new
    > API should be different depending on privilege level -- adding a
    > privilege should just make things work that would otherwise fail.  You
    > might end up with bugs where a program is completely safe if run
    > without CAP_SYS_ADMIN but, if run with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, bad things
    > happen.  (The behavior of setuid(geteuid()) is an example of this
    > problem.)
    > One way to fix it is to make setting a filter program fail unless
    > capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) || no_new_privs.

    Good call. I'll upgrade the interaction with no_new_privs to be
    explicit in the next revision. It is certainly more transparent and
    removes the risk of unintended consequences.

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      Last update: 2012-01-28 20:53    [W:0.021 / U:9.872 seconds]
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