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    SubjectRe: [PATCH 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe
    On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Colin Walters <> wrote:
    > On Sun, 2012-01-15 at 16:37 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
    >> Because chroot is an easy way to break out of chroot jail, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
    >> is still required if the caller is already chrooted.
    > This part is pretty gross.  It means it won't work for stuff like
    > containers (systemd-nspawn etc.) and furthermore I have plans that
    > involve running OS trees inside a chroot, and this would obviously not
    > work for that.


    Unprivileged bind mounts would be a much better approach, but that
    would need some concept of an unprivileged user owning a namespace.
    Maybe the namespace id work would make this work.

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