[lkml]   [2012]   [Jan]   [16]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
SubjectRe: [PATCH 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe
On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Colin Walters <> wrote:
> On Sun, 2012-01-15 at 16:37 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> Because chroot is an easy way to break out of chroot jail, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>> is still required if the caller is already chrooted.
> This part is pretty gross.  It means it won't work for stuff like
> containers (systemd-nspawn etc.) and furthermore I have plans that
> involve running OS trees inside a chroot, and this would obviously not
> work for that.


Unprivileged bind mounts would be a much better approach, but that
would need some concept of an unprivileged user owning a namespace.
Maybe the namespace id work would make this work.

To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to
More majordomo info at
Please read the FAQ at

 \ /
  Last update: 2012-01-16 21:21    [from the cache]
©2003-2014 Jasper Spaans. hosted at Digital Ocean