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    SubjectRe: [Security] [PATCH 2/2] taskstats: restrict access to user
    On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 10:45:20AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
    > On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 10:39 AM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote:
    > >
    > > Shouldn't it simply protect taskstats_user_cmd()?  You may still poll
    > > the counters with TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_PID/TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_TGID.
    >
    > Yeah, I wondered where I'd really want to hook it in, that was the
    > other option.
    >
    > However, one thing that I'm currently independently asking some
    > networking people is whether that patch guarantees anything at all: is
    > the netlink command even guaranteed to be run in the same context as
    > the person sending it?
    >
    > After all, it comes in as a packet of data. How synchronous is the
    > genetlink thing guaranteed to be in the first place?
    >
    > IOW, are *any* of those "check current capabilities/euid" approaches
    > really guaranteed to be valid? Are they valid today, will they
    > necessarily be valid in a year?

    Netlink was made syncronous by commit cd40b7d3983c708aabe3d3008ec64ffce56d33b0
    "[NET]: make netlink user -> kernel interface synchronious".
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