[lkml]   [2011]   [Sep]   [19]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
SubjectRe: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo
On Mon, 2011-09-19 at 20:51 +0300, Pekka Enberg wrote:
> How is the attacker able to identify that we kmalloc()'d from ecryptfs or
> VFS based on non-root /proc/slabinfo when the slab allocator itself does
> not have that sort of information if you mix up the allocations? Isn't this
> much stronger protection especially if you combine that with /proc/slabinfo
> restriction?

Mixing it up just adds noise. It makes the attack somewhat more
difficult, but it still leaves open the possibility that the attacker
can filter out the noise somehow.

-- Dave

 \ /
  Last update: 2011-09-19 20:07    [W:0.224 / U:0.136 seconds]
©2003-2017 Jasper Spaans. hosted at Digital OceanAdvertise on this site