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    SubjectRe: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo
    On Mon, 2011-09-19 at 20:51 +0300, Pekka Enberg wrote:
    > How is the attacker able to identify that we kmalloc()'d from ecryptfs or
    > VFS based on non-root /proc/slabinfo when the slab allocator itself does
    > not have that sort of information if you mix up the allocations? Isn't this
    > much stronger protection especially if you combine that with /proc/slabinfo
    > restriction?

    Mixing it up just adds noise. It makes the attack somewhat more
    difficult, but it still leaves open the possibility that the attacker
    can filter out the noise somehow.

    -- Dave

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