Messages in this thread |  | | | Date | Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:31:42 +0300 | | Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo | | From | Pekka Enberg <> |
| |
On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 7:18 PM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote: >> However, if the encryptfs and infoleaks really are serious enough to >> hide /proc/slabinfo, I think you should consider switching over to >> kmalloc() instead of kmem_cache_alloc() to make sure nobody can >> gain access to the information. > > kmalloc() is still visible in slabinfo as kmalloc-128 or so.
Yes, but there's no way for users to know where the allocations came from if you mix them up with other kmalloc-128 call-sites. That way the number of private files will stay private to the user, no? Doesn't that give you even better protection against the infoleak?
Pekka
|  |