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    SubjectRe: [PATCH 2/2] x86: Allow disabling of sys_iopl, sys_ioperm
    On Thu, Jul 14, 2011 at 4:00 PM, Alan Cox <> wrote:
    >> > a) you can do this with a security module
    >> I can?   How?   The whole LSM approach seems intractable to me.
    > It would certainly need some trivial tweaking (to be specific we'd need
    > to move from capable(x) to capable_syscall(x, syscall_code) for those
    > interfaces that mattered, but that would probably be a good thing anyway
    > from the point of view of beating the capability model into something more
    > flexible and would help stuff like SELinux as well I think.

    The idea of building more obtuse logic on top of posix capabilities
    made me puke in my mouth :(

    > We have an underlying separation of security from the other details - we
    > really should keep it clean that way.

    An aspect oriented approach to security is probably fine for
    environments where you want to allow somebody access to features.

    In my case, I simply don't want these "features", which is why I took
    the compile time approach to turning this stuff off. I realize that
    these syscalls (and the /dev/port interface) are not comprehensive (I
    didn't say they were either). I'm happy though to take suggestions
    for stuff I probably should be disabling considering my goal of making
    it difficult for root to compromise a system. And yes, modules are
    disabled :)
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