Messages in this thread | | | From | Linus Torvalds <> | Date | Wed, 29 Jun 2011 13:09:24 -0700 | Subject | Re: [Security] [PATCH 2/2] taskstats: restrict access to user |
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On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 5:09 AM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote: > taskstats information may be used for gathering private information. > E.g. for openssh and vsftpd daemons read_characters/write_characters may > be used to learn the precise password length. Restrict it to processes > being able to ptrace the target process.
Ok, having looked at this some more, I'm quite ready to just mark the whole TASKSTATS config option as BROKEN. It does seem to be a horrible security hazard, and very little seems to use it.
It also seems to be really fundamentally broken. Afaik, there's no way to filter taskstats not only by security issues (Vasiliy's patch really is very ugly), but it seems to be some global cross-namespace thing too, so it exposes taskstats across pid namespaces afaik. It does that even with Vasiliy's patch, afaik, although then I think you need to have collissions in the namespaces if I read the code correctly.
I suspect that could be fixed by adding a pid namespace to the 'listener' structure. Also adding a 'cred' pointer (or the actual listener thread pointer) to it would make Vasiliy's patch more palatable, since then you wouldn't need to look up the credentials at send_cpu_listeners() time.
Maybe I have mis-read the code. But it does all make me shudder. There doesn't even seem to be all that many _users_ of the thing, so the problems it has really makes me go "is that code worth it"? We probably should never have merged it in the first place.
Linus -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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