Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 17 Jun 2011 19:50:58 +0400 | From | Vasiliy Kulikov <> | Subject | Re: [RFC v1] security: introduce ptrace_task_access_check() |
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On Fri, Jun 17, 2011 at 11:43 -0400, Eric Paris wrote: > >Please help me to figure out how such patch should be divided to be > >applied. I think about such scheme: > > > >1) add generic security/* functions. > >2-4) add ptrace_task_access_check() for SMACK, AppArmor and SELinux. > >5) change ptrace_access_check() in security ops and all LSMs to > > ptrace_task_access_check(). > > > >But I'd like to hear maintainers' oppinions not to put useless efforts. > > Not a real review, but I didn't instantly grok the need for the new > cap functions.
It is needed because of capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE) and similar inside of ptrace_may_access() implementations.
> So maybe that's it's own patch with it's own change > log. After that you should just add the 'parent' task to > ptrace_access_check() and fix all of the LSMs to handle the new > semantics at once. No need to rename the function or do a bunch of > seperate patchs.
I thought it would represent function's semantic changes more strongly.
> All of us LSM authors can just ACK our little part > and James can take the patch when everyone has their say. I think > that will make history the cleanest.....
Great! It would be much simple for me too :)
Thanks,
-- Vasiliy Kulikov http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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