Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 27 May 2011 19:16:11 +0200 | From | Ingo Molnar <> | Subject | Re: [RFC][PATCH] Randomize kernel base address on boot |
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* Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> wrote:
> Just to play devil's advocate, how is it easier for a local > attacker to figure out where kernel internals are if it's been > relinked vs. randomized at load time, assuming we follow through on > fixing the info leaks?
Well, 'fixing the info leaks' will obfuscate previously useful files such as /proc/kallsyms ...
That's one of the advantages of randomization: it allows us to expose RIPs without them being an instant information leak.
Thanks,
Ingo
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