Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering | From | Steven Rostedt <> | Date | Thu, 26 May 2011 13:07:16 -0400 |
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On Thu, 2011-05-26 at 09:46 -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> And if you filter system calls, it's entirely possible that you can > attack suid executables through such a vector. Your "limit system > calls for security" security suddenly turned into "avoid the system > call that made things secure"! > > See what I'm saying?
So you are not complaining about this implementation, but the use of syscall filtering?
There may be some user that says, "oh I don't want my other apps to be able to call setuid" thinking it will secure their application even more. But because that application did the brain dead thing to not check the return code of setuid, and it just happened to be running privileged, it then execs off another application that can root the box.
Because, originally that setuid would have succeeded if the user did nothing special, but now with this filtering, and the user thinking that they could limit their app from doing harm, they just opened up a hole that caused their app to do the exact opposite and give the exec'd app full root privileges.
Did I get this right?
-- Steve
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