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    Subject[PATCH] [33/106] ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace
    Date
    2.6.35-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

    ------------------
    From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>

    commit 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54 upstream.

    Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
    copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
    zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
    to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
    information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
    process.

    The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was
    introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by
    6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
    CAP_NET_ADMIN.

    Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
    Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
    Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
    Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>

    ---
    net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 3 +++
    1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

    Index: linux-2.6.35.y/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
    ===================================================================
    --- linux-2.6.35.y.orig/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
    +++ linux-2.6.35.y/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
    @@ -1289,6 +1289,7 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void _
    /* overflow check */
    if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
    return -ENOMEM;
    + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;

    newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
    if (!newinfo)
    @@ -1835,6 +1836,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void
    return -ENOMEM;
    if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
    return -ENOMEM;
    + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;

    newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
    if (!newinfo)
    @@ -2064,6 +2066,7 @@ do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd
    ret = -EFAULT;
    break;
    }
    + rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0;

    if (cmd == IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET)
    target = 1;

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