Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 24 Mar 2011 18:44:17 +0000 | From | Al Viro <> | Subject | Re: procfs: boot- and runtime configurable access mode for /proc/<pid> dirs |
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On Thu, Mar 24, 2011 at 08:22:30PM +0200, Alexey Dobriyan wrote: > On Thu, Mar 24, 2011 at 09:41:58AM +0100, Daniel Reichelt wrote: > > > Keeping u/g/o inside kernel is horrible. > > > > Why exactly? Since it's only a char and not char[] I don't see the > > disadvantage over int or a define or whatever. Of course I could always > > change that if that's a de-facto standard I just didn't know about. > > Keep mode_t inside kernel, this will get rid of many ifdefs. > > > > What is the usecase? Content of /proc/* is identical. > > > > Use-case is to isolate process information from other users' or groups' > > eyes, e.g. with 550 the output of ps aux only lists processes of the > > groups your user is a member of. > > This is doable with some ps(1) switch, I'm sure. > > The content of /proc/$PID directory is not a secret.
More to the point, permissions in /proc/<pid>/* don't do us much good. As the matter of fact, we ought to make them all flat - i.e. same for user/group/other, since we have to recheck access rights on every damn IO operations. Checks done at open() are useless here - have the task exec suid-root binary and they are obsolete.
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