Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: Using ftrace/perf as a basis for generic seccomp | From | Eric Paris <> | Date | Fri, 04 Feb 2011 11:36:28 -0500 |
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On Thu, 2011-02-03 at 23:06 +0100, Stefan Fritsch wrote:
> - only allow syscalls in the mode (non-compat/compat) that the prctl > call was made in
This is what I was thinking. If it was a compat task when it dropped things from the set of syscalls we should implicitly deny all non-compat syscalls, and vice versa.
> - deny exec of setuid/setgid binaries > - deny exec of binaries with filesystem capabilities
I think both of these are wrong to try to address here. The right way to handle these is to
1) set prctl(SECBIT_NOROOT) 2) drop all caps from the bset, pP, pE, and pI 3) make sure the setuid(2) syscall (not to be confused with SETUID filesystem bit) is not in the set of allowed syscalls. Thus rendering suid and file with fcaps irrelevant.
-Eric
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