Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 7 Dec 2011 20:54:59 +0000 | From | Alan Cox <> | Subject | Re: chroot(2) and bind mounts as non-root |
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On Wed, 07 Dec 2011 12:34:28 -0800 "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> wrote:
> On 12/07/2011 09:54 AM, Colin Walters wrote: > > > > The historical reason one can't call chroot(2) as non-root is because of > > setuid binaries (hard link a setuid binary into chroot of your choice > > with trojaned libc.so). > > No. The historical reason is that it lets anyone escape a chroot jail:
Beg to differ
Nobody ever considered chroot a jail except a certain brand of urban-legend-programming people. Indeed chroot has never been a jail except in the 'open prison' security sense of it.
The big problem with chroot was abusing setuid binaries - particularly things like uucp and /bin/mail.
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