Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 5 Oct 2011 00:02:16 +0200 (CEST) | From | Jiri Kosina <> | Subject | Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust |
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On Tue, 4 Oct 2011, Heiko Carstens wrote:
> > I have a question here. In case people are 'reasonably certain' that the > > old key has never been jeoparadized, why are they required to create a new > > key? > > > > (if the old key would have been compromised, the attacker could as well > > generate a new key and sign it with the old key himself, so I fail to see > > any benefit of this PGP excercise). > > > > It doesn't make too much sense to force people to live with two different > > personalities in this "PGP web of trust" world just for the sake of > > kernel.org, does it? > > Also same question here. And as far as I can tell nobody has given an > answer yet.
In the meantime, at least one reason came up in parallel discussion ... a lot of people have those oldish keys generated as 1024bit or so, and using DSA.
And it seems like 4096/RSA is sort of required here.
-- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
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