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SubjectRe: [PATCH 3/6] secmark: export binary yes/no rather than kernel internal secid
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On Mon, 2010-09-27 at 15:25 -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> On Mon, 2010-09-27 at 14:29 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Mon, 2010-09-27 at 13:01 -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> > > On Mon, 2010-09-27 at 10:50 +1000, James Morris wrote:
> > > > On Fri, 24 Sep 2010, Eric Paris wrote:
> > >
> > > > For the reasons above, I think the secctx string needs to be exported in
> > > > addition to this rather than instead of.
> > >
> > > I won't argue, I don't agree with your reasoning, but I'm not opposed to
> > > this result. We have 3 competing suggestions:
> > >
> > > Jan suggested we:
> > > completely eliminate secmark from procfs+netlink and only export secctx
> > > in netlink.
> > >
> > > Eric suggested we:
> > > completely eliminate secmark from procfs+netlink and then export secctx
> > > in procfs+netlink
> > >
> > > sounds like James suggested we:
> > > continue to export meaningless and confusing secmark from procfs+netlink
> > > and then export secctx in procfs+netlink as well.
> > >
> > > I'm going to implement James' idea and resend the patch series. Any
> > > strong objections?
> >
> > I apologize for not getting a chance to look at these patches sooner.
> > In general they look fine to me and my only real concern was addressed
> > by Pablo already (breaking userspace due to #define changes).
> >
> > As far as exporting the 32bit secid/secmark to userspace, I think that
> > is a mistake. James correctly points out that it does map to a LSM
> > specific value, e.g. SELinux and Smack security labels, but I don't
> > think he makes it clear that in the two LSMs that currently use secids
> > the mapping between the secid and the secctx is not constant; the secids
> > are transient values that will change with each boot in a manner that
> > userspace can not predict. For this reason, I think exporting the
> > secids is only going to cause users/admins grief, whereas exporting the
> > associated secctx should be a much more stable value and is likely what
> > the user/admin is expecting anyway.
>
> So it sounds to me like Paul agrees with me that exporting the SELinux
> sid as 'secmark=' was a bad idea. It's the whole reason this thread
> started, someone wanted to be able to translate and use that field (and
> instantly realized it was useless.)
>
> I see it as having 3 options. lets assume was have a packet with
> selinux sid=121 and selinux context=packet_t. We can
>
> 1) secmark=121 secctx=packet_t
> This continues to send secmark like we do and people might continue to
> be baffled by the 121.
>
> 2) secmark=1 secctx=packet_t
> This sends a secmark field to userspace so if an application which
> reads this exists (I doubt such an application actually exists in in the
> real world) it will still get all of the information it got before but
> noone will be baffled by what the number means. 1/0 is pretty obvious.
>
> 3) secctx=packet_t
> Smallest easiest, what my patches actually do. Could theoretically
> break some script that expected the field to be there, but any such
> script is already broken since that field can be easily compiled
> out......
>
> James, if you are adamant about #1 I'll resend, otherwise I'm sticking
> with #3.....

James, if you do feel strongly about door #1, can you provide a good
example of how someone might use the secid to do something useful in
userspace? I ask because I can't think of anything and it would be nice
to have the example on record for future work.

--
paul moore
linux @ hp




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