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    SubjectRe: [PATCH] ptrace: allow restriction of ptrace scope
    Hi James,

    On Thu, Jun 17, 2010 at 11:45:42PM +1000, James Morris wrote:
    > On Wed, 16 Jun 2010, Kees Cook wrote:
    > [Note: it would be useful to cc: the LSM list on security discussions]

    Sorry, I was blindly using get_maintainer output.

    > > Certainly. PTRACE can already be confined by SELinux and AppArmor. I'm
    > > looking for a general approach that doesn't require a system builder to
    > > create MAC policies for unknown software. I want to define a common core
    > > behavior.
    > >
    > > > And even if you don't care about using the same security stuff the rest
    > > > of the world is using to solve the problem this like the other half baked
    > > > stuff you posted for links belongs as a security module.
    > >
    > > The LSM isn't stackable, so I can't put it there and choose this and
    > > SELinux (for the case of software-without-a-policy).
    > SELinux already supports a global switch for ptrace via the allow_ptrace
    > boolean. You don't need to write any policy, just set it to 0.
    > Global behavior can be further customized and refined (e.g. create a
    > generic policy module for apps without an existing policy, which allows
    > everything except things like ptrace and dangerous symlinks).
    > SELinux users would not need the other LSM, and stacking is thus not
    > required.

    But if a user wants to disable ptrace using the SELinux LSM and then
    also disable sticky-symlinks via the ItsHideous LSM, they're out of luck.


    Kees Cook
    Ubuntu Security Team

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